5. The Argument from Hallucination

About this Lecture

Lecture

In this module, we think about the challenge to direct realism posted by hallucinations, focusing in particular on: (i) the extent to which hallucinations pose a bigger problem to direct realists than illusions; (ii) the importance of the Common Kind Assumption to the indirect realist's position; and (iii) the direct realist's claim that the Common Kind Assumption is not true.

Course

In this course, Dr Laura Gow explores the theory of perception known as direct realism. In the first module, we think about why perception is so important to us, before contrasting direct realism with another popular theory of perception: indirect realism. After that, in the second module, we think about the key advantages of direct realism as a theory of perception, before turning in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth modules to four of the key challenges to direct realism: the argument from illusion, the argument from perceptual variation, the argument from hallucination, and time lag cases. In a short seventh module, we offer a summary of the topics covered in the course.

Lecturer

Dr Laura Gow is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. Her research interests are mainly in the philosophy of mind, with a particular focus on perception and perceptual experience. Her published work criticises contemporary attempts to provide physicalist accounts of perception, and her recent research explores the less appealing implications of endorsing a genuinely physicalist account of mind.