2. Nikita Khrushchev’s Decision to Send Missiles to Cuba

About this Lecture

Lecture

In this module, we think about the reasons for Khrushchev’s decision to install medium-range nuclear missiles on Cuba, focusing in particular on: (i) Khrushchev’s concerns about the military strength and reach of the United States, including: the potential for a US invasion of Cuba, the widening missile gap between the two states, etc. (ii) the impact of the Sino-Soviet split from the 1950s onwards; (iii) the impact of the Berlin Crisis of 1961; and (iv) the build-up of Soviet arms on Cuba – both conventional and nuclear – from mid-1962 onwards.

Course

In this course, Professor Mark White (Queen Mary, University of London) explores one of the most crucial events of the Cold War - the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. We begin by thinking about the background to the Cuban Missile Crisis, including Kennedy’s policies towards Cuba in 1961 and early 1962 – and especially the Bay of Pigs Invasion. In the second module, we examine Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to install medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. In the third module, we think about events from late summer through to early autumn, by which point the situation in Cuba has become a major talking-point in US politics. In the fourth module, we think about the ‘private’ phase of the crisis between 14-22 October, before turning in the fifth module to the ‘public’ phase of the crisis between 22-28 October.

Lecturer

Mark White is Professor of History at Queen Mary, University of London, specialising in US foreign policy in the Cold War and the US presidency since 1945. His recent publications include Against the President: Dissent and Decision-Making in the White House (2007) and The Presidency of Bill Clinton: The Legacy of a New Domestic and Foreign Policy (2012)