2. Why be an Anti-Realist?

About this Lecture

Lecture

In this module, we outline four reasons why a philosopher might adopt the position of anti-realism: (i) the lack of scientific evidence for the existence of moral properties; (ii) the strangeness of moral properties, even if they did exist; (iii) consistency with one’s pre-existing philosophical commitments (e.g. A. J. Ayer and his ‘verification principle’); and (iv) atheism. After that, there is a brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of moral anti-realism vs. moral realism.

Course

In this course, Dr Luke Elson (University of Reading) explores what it means to be a moral anti-realist. We begin in the first module by thinking about what moral anti-realism actually is. After that, in the second module, we outline four reasons why someone might be an anti-realist. In the following three modules, we think about three anti-realist positions: first, A. J. Ayer’s theory of emotivism; second, R. M. Hare’s theory of prescriptivism; and third, J. L. Mackie’s Error Theory. In the sixth and seventh modules, we think about two of the major weaknesses of anti-realism: first, its inability to explain moral disagreements; and second, its inability to explain moral progress. Finally, in the eighth module, we think about the extent to which moral anti-realism leads to nihilism. And in that case, why be moral at all?

Lecturer

Luke Elson is a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Reading. His research interests include ethics, reasons and rationality, especially when they involve vagueness.